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COMMENTS
THE RIGHT IN WISCONSIN OF DIRECTORS,
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYES TO INDEMNIFICATION
BY THEIR CORPORATION
I. INTRODUCTION
"(M)any state legislatures, motivated, at least in part, by a desire
to encourage capable and responsible men to become directors and of-
ficers and at the same time to discourage so-called 'strike' suits by
stockholders, have enacted statutes permitting or even requiring the
corporation to indemnify or reimburse defendant directors or officers,
under specified conditions."' Wisconsin has statutes, one which is
permissive 2 and the other which is mandatory,3 concerning the indemni-
fication of a director or officer. The mandatory statute also provides for
the indemnification of an employe. It also has a security-for-expense
statute4 which would seem to be a deterrent to suits by impecunious
minority shareholders and those of the "strike" variety.5 Their import-
ance has been enhanced by the recent rash of anti-trust suits. The ques-
tion of when and under what circumstances indemnification is to be
made will be explored in this article. The exact answers to these
questions are not always clear. One of the reasons for the interest pres-
'39 A.L.R. 2d 580 at 583 (1955).
2WIs. STAT. §180.04(14) (1959). General powers. Each corporation, when no
inconsistent provision is made by law or by its articles of incorporation, shall
have the power; ...
(14) To indemnify any director or officer or former director or officer of the
corporation, or any person who may have served at its request as a di-
rector or officer of another corporation in which it owns shares of capital
stock or of which it is a creditor, against expenses actually and neces-
sarily incurred by him in connection with the defense of any action, suit
or proceeding in which he is made a party by reason of being or having
been such director or officer, except in relation to matters as to which he
shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negli-
gence or misconduct in the performance of duty; but such indemnifica-
tion shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which such
director or officer may be entitled, under any by-law, agreement, vote of
stockholders, or otherwise.
3 WIS. STAT. §180.407 (1959), cited in full in text infra.
4 WIS. STAT. §180.405(4) (1959). In any action brought in the right of any
foreign or domestic corporation by the holder or holders of less than 3 per
cent of any class of shares issued and outstanding, the defendants shall be
entitled on application to the court to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give
security for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees. The amount of
such security may thereafter from time to time be increased or decreased in
the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such action upon showing
that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.
5 Revision Committee Note, 1953: This section is a substitute for §180.40(7)
(STATS. 1951). The problem in the shareholders derivative action is the possi-
bility of its abuse for personal profit. This possibility bears no relation to the
number of shares held by the plaintiff or his ability to furnish security for
expenses. This section is designed to handle the problem directly. The elimina-
tion of the chance for personal profit should discourage the strike suit without
imposing any obstacles to the good faith action. (Bill 524-S).
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ently in Wisconsin is the fact that the mandatory statute was amended
in 1959 and now reads as follows:
Indemnifying directors, officers and employes. Any person
made a party to or threatened with any civil, criminal or admin-
istrative action, suit or proceeding by reason of the fact that he,
his testator or intestate, is or was a director, officer or employe
of any corporation shall be indemnified by the corporation
against the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, actually
and necessarily incurred by him in connection with such action,
suit or proceeding, or in connection with any appeal therein, ex-
cept as to matters as to which such director, officer or employe
is guilty of negligence or misconduct in the performance of his
duties. Such right of indemnification shall not be deemed exclu-
sive of any other rights to which such director, officer or employe
may be entitled apart from this section.7 (The italicized words
indicate the change.)
Wisconsin would seem to be the only state which includes "criminal"
in its mandatory statute.8
HIsToRICAL BACKGROUND
Wisconsin seems to have been the first state to have the question of
indemnification determined by the judiciary in Figge v. Bergenthal,"
decided in 1906. The case, perhaps, has been overemphasized as de-
termining the right to indemnification, since the stockholders by resolu-
tion had given their consent to payment of the costs. The court said:
"Clearly if no case is made against the defendants it is not improper or
unjust that the corporation should pay for the defense of the action."' 0
Later, in Jesse v.' Four Wheel Drive Auto Company," decided in 1922,
the Wisconsin Court denied indemnification to directors. Here, however,
the court determined that they were acting for their own interests and
not for the interests of the corporation, and, therefore, they would not
be entitled to indemnification even under a very broad interpretation of
any existing statute. At common law, the successful plaintiff usually was
allowed to recover reasonable expenses on a benefit-to-the-corporation
theory." However, a federal case handed down in 192313 stood for the
principle that there can be no recovery where there has been a criminal
charge. "In doing a perfectly legal thing, the agent may do it in such
careless and negligent manner as to subject himself to a charge of crimi-
6 Here the Wisconsin Legislature in 1959 deleted the words "the defense of"
from the statute of 1957.
7 WIS. STAT. §180A07 (1959).
8 MODEL Bus. CoRp. AcT ANN. §4(o) T2.03(4) (1960).
9 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1906).
'o Id. at 625, 109 N.W. at 592.
"1177 Wis. 627, 189 N.W. 276 (1922).
12 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 295 (1955).
'3 DuPuy v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 288 Fed. 583 (1923).
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nality, and for the expenses of defending himself against such charge
there can be no recovery in law."'
14
Wisconsin first passed a mandatory indemnification statute in 1949,
drafted on the request of a Madison attorney who was lobbying for a
large corporation.15 Contrary to the annotations' 6 this statute was not
dropped in 1951 but rather turned up in another chapter.17 In 1953,
therefore, Wisconsin had the dubious distinction of having two manda-
tory indemnification statutes' s and one permissive indemnification stat-
ute. 9 The change in wording of the mandatory statute from the time it
was adopted in 1949 until it again appeared in 1953 in Chapter 180
could be significant. In the first, it ordered indemnity for director 0 "ex-
cept in relation to matters as to which it shall be adjudged . . . that
such director ... is liable for misconduct in the performance of his
duties."'" The later version made indemnity mandatory "except as to
matters as to which such director ... is guilty of negligence or mis-
conduct in the performance of his duties. 22 (Emphasis added.) The per-
missive statute still says "shall be adjudged."'"
Just why the fuss over the changing of the statute wording to cover
"criminal and administrative"2 4 from the previous "any action, suit or
proceeding"2 5 which would seem to cover everything on the entire
"waterfront ?" The mandatory indemnification statute in Wisconsin was
drafted with Section 64 of the New York General Corporation Law
26
14 Id. at 588.
15 1950 Wis. L. REv. 160.
16 Commenting on §180.407 the Revision Committee (1953) states: This section
was in the 1949 law as s. 180.34, but was omitted in 1951. It is felt that the
section should be restored; that indemnification, if warranted, should be auto-
matic and should not lie in the discretion of directors whose association with
fellow directors is often too intimate to permit unbiased consideration, and
who, in considering indemnification will be faced with the problem of self-
dealing....
'17 WIS. STAT. §182.034 (1951).
2s WIs. STATS. §180.407 and §182.034 (1953). For all practical purposes they are
identical with only the heading different; one including directors and the
other omitting them in the heading.
19 Wis. STAT. §180.04(14) (1953).
20 Whenever the word "director" is used subsequently in this article, it shall be
presumed to cover officer and employe also unless otherwise stated or it is
evident from the text itself.21 
WIs. STAT. §180.34 (1949).22 WIS. STAT. §180A07 (1953).
23 WIs. STAT. §180.04(14) (1959). This is the same as Wis. STAT. §182.01(9a)
(1945).
24 WIs. STAT. §180.407 (1959).
2 5 
WIs. STAT. §180A07 (1957).
26 NEw YORic GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §64. Any person made a party to any
action, suit or proceeding by reason of the fact that he, his testator or intestate,
is or was a director, officer or employee of a corporation shall be entitled to
have his reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, actually and necessarily
incurred by him in connection with the defense of such action, suit or pro-
ceeding, and in connection with any appeal therein, assessed against the cor-
poration or against another corporation at the request of which be served as
such director, officer or employee, upon court order, . . ., except in relation to
matters as to which it shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding that
[Vol. 46
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serving as a guide.27 Therefore we may look to their decisions for some
guide as to how the Wisconsin courts might solve the problems. It
would seem that the problem has never been litigated in Wisconsin un-
der the statutes. In a leading New York case, Schwarz v. General Ani-
line & Film Corp.,28 a director was indicted for alleged violations of
the Sherman Anti-trust Act, pleaded nolo contendere and was fined
$500. He sued to recover the expenses involved and the lower courts
denied him recovery because the nolo contendere plea and the fine con-
stituted misconduct and barred any recovery. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, but on the ground that it was a criminal action and that the
statute did not cover criminal actions. ". . . (W)hile a plea of nolo
contendere is not an admission of guilt, it none the less is a conviction
and has the same consequence in the criminal cause in which it is
entered, as a plea of guilty."29 They held that "any action, suit or pro-
ceeding" did not include criminal actions and therefore denied indemni-
fication. This was a 4-3 decision with a strong dissent which will be
referred to later in this article. The court later stated that: "It would be
a very strange public policy, indeed, which would set up legal machin-
ery whereby one charged with, or convicted of, a crime, of whatever
kind, could require the corporation by whom he was employed to pay
his legal expenses." 30 This could be called an oversimplification be-
cause the director would hardly attempt to have the corporation defend
him against the charge of murder, for example. This should not be a
question of criminal activity but consideration should be given to the
inherent nature of the wrongful acts, whether malum in se or inalum
prohibitum, the ultimate success or failure of the defense, and not the
mere quirk of fate which determines whether the charge be criminal
or civil and thus the right to indemnification. The holding has been criti-
cized. "This interpretation [of the statutes] seems to restrict the scope
of the statute unduly. . . . Furthermore, at least where the defendant
is successful, the public policy in favor of reimbursing a director who
has acted prudently would seem to be the same whether the action is
civil or criminal."-" It is interesting to note that here the court said it
was against public policy and not within the rights conferred by statute
to indemnify the director, but in the concurring opinion, in which the
majority concurred also, it was expressly stated that the corporation
could either in the articles of incorporation or by-laws allow reimburse-
ment including "specifically not only civil but criminal actions."3' One
such officer, director or employee is liable for negligence or misconduct in the
performance of his duties.
27 1950 Wis. L. RYv. 160.
28 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E. 2d 533 (1916).
29 Id. at , 113 N.E. 2d at 534.
30 Id. at 536.
3167 HARv. L. REv. 515.
32 Supra note 28, at 405, 113 N.E. 2d at 537.
19621
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
writer said that the recovery here should have been sought not by statute
but under the principles of agency: "that the director, as the corpora-
tion's agent for the carrying out of policies, not manifestly illegal, nor
known to the director to be so, which got it and him into trouble with
the government, is entitled to be made whole by his principal." 33 How-
ever, there may be a problem here in that the directors are hardly agents
of the corporation, in the same sense that officers or employes are agents.
"The problem of the protection of directors against substantial expenses
incurred in defending suits brought against them for what they had
done or failed to do in their capacity as directors is, apart from statute,
different from the problem of such protection for officers and employees
who, as agents of the corporation, enjoy protection under the principles
of agency law. Some courts have held that directors are analogous to
trustees and are therefore entitled to equitable indemnification under
the principles of trust law. Other courts have held that directors are
sui generis and not so entitled." 34 Thus it is evident that there is good
reason for the concern over the addition of the word "criminal" in the
statute, although I do not mean to suggest that this is the only method
of handling this problem. Wisconsin, therefore, has amended its statute
so that the problem of the Schwarz case should not arise in this juris-
diction, insofar as the question of the intent of the legislature is con-
cerned because they have specifically covered criminal actions now in
the mandatory statute. Public policy has been deemed by the legislature
to not only allow indemnification in criminal actions but actually to de-
mand it, with, of course, the proviso that such director is not "guilty
of negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties." 35
CONCERNING THE PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE
Since in various anti-trust situations the same state of facts may
give rise to either criminal or civil charges, the director is at the mercy
of the government attorneys who make the decision whether to prose-
cute the cause of action civilly or criminally. It is something analogous
to "open season" on directors and the mere whim of the government
determines if a man is to be tried as a criminal or not. After all, di-
rectors are human and liable to the frailties of humans and may at times
find themselves subject to criminal proceedings because of a desire not
to aid themselves but, rather, the corporation of which they are di-
rectors. "The director cannot safeguard himself by the simple process
3369 HARV. L. REv. 1057 at 1075-76. This is an excellent discussion of director's
rights to indemnification in general. This agency theory would seem to be in
keeping with MECHEm ON Aac.:\my §1603: "Whenever an agent is called upon
by his principal to do an act which is not manifestly illegal and which he does
not know to be wrong, the law implies a promise on the part of the principal
to indemnify the agent for such losses as flow directly and immediately from
the very execution of the agency."
34 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. §4(o) T14.01 (1960).
35 Wis. STAT. §180.407 (1959).
[Vol. 46
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of refraining from conscious wrongdoing. In the first place, there are
sizable areas of corporation law in which it is not easy to tell in
advance what a court will regard as permissible. In the second place, no
matter how innocent the director, he will probably incur substantial
counsel fees, payable win, lose, or draw, in the course of defending
himself if charges are brought." 36 These anti-trust suits require much
preparation, many exhibits, and the production of much evidence which
is peculiarly time consuming and costly. For these reasons the courts
are often times very ready to accept a plea of nolo contendere to ex-
pedite the disposition of the case and the corporation is happy to so plead
to avoid the expense of a long drawn out trial. The plea is, however,
within the discretion of the court to accept or reject. The problem arises
as to what happens to the director who pleads nolo contendere. Can he
be indemnified; must he be indemnified or is he just out the cost of
counsel which can be quite formidable even with such a plea? Certainly
the Schwarz case 37 intimates that such a plea would often preclude the
director from indemnification. "[W]hile a plea of nolo contendere is
not an admission of guilt, it none the less is a conviction and has the same
consequences, in the criminal cause in which it is entered, as a plea of
guilty."38 However the court did not decide the case on this basis even
though this had been the basis in the lower courts. They just said that
in a criminal prosecution the New York statutes did not allow indemni-
fication. They expressly stated "it is unnecessary to examine the inter-
esting question of whether a plea of 'nolo contendere' in a Federal court
is an 'adjudication' of 'misconduct.' "39
Justice Fuld wrote a strong and scathing dissent in the Schwarz
case in which he tells why he thinks that a plea of nolo contendere
should not preclude the director from being indemnified.
While the judgment entered upon nolo contendere may, there-
fore, be regarded as a conviction under certain statutes applying
to multiple offenses, such a judgment has never been considered
an adjudication of guilt or even an admission of any fact con-
tained in the indictment....
Any doubt that a judgment entered upon a nolo contendere
plea is in the nature of a compromise, a settlement of the con-
troversy, rather than an adjudication of any fact asserted or a
determination of any charge alleged is laid to rest by a Clayton
Act Provision (38 U.S. Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C.A. §16); . . . even
if I were to assume that a plea of nolo contendere is an acknowl-
edgment of guilt, it still would not follow that a judgment entered
upon such a plea amounts to an adjudication that the petitioner
3669 HARv. L. Rxv. 1058 (1956).
37 Supra note 28, at , 113 N.E. 2d 533.
38 Id. at 534.
39 Id. at 536.
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was "liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of
his duties."4 0
In Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the court allowed recovery to a
director convicted in a criminal anti-trust suit on the ground that by the
plea of nolo contendere "a valuable consideration moved from the de-
fendants to the corporation, and the corporation clearly benefited there-
by."'41 In fact this case went so far as to actually reimburse the directors
for the fine paid.
WISCONSIN LAW
The mandatory statute for indemnification in Wisconsin42 requires
indemnification except where the director "is guilty of negligence or
misconduct in the performance of his duties. '43 [Emphasis added.] It
also has the saving clause, "Such right of indemnification shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which such director, officer or
employe may be entitled apart from this section."4 4 Certainly this would
save the director who has won the case in the courts. There may be a
problem with one who, for convenience and financial saving, pleads
nolo contendere.
The mandatory statute expressly allows reasonable expenses, includ-
ing attorney fees "in connection with any appeal."45
The permissive statute46 for indemnification allows the corporation
to indemnify the director except where he "shall be adjudged.., to be
liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty."4 7 It
also has a saving clause which while perhaps no broader, at least is
somewhat more explicit as to how this indemnification may be per-
mitted; "but such indemnification shall not be deemed exclusive of any
other rights to which such director or officer may be entitled, under any
by-law, agreement, vote of shareholders, or otherwise. '4 8 [Emphasis
added.]
This saving clause is similar to the saving clause in the Delaware
statute 9 about which another writer stated: "Under the indemnity
4oId. at 541-542.
41 Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 170 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 270 at 275
(1942); aff'd, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 589 (1944).
4-'Wis. STAT. §180A07 (1959).
43Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 WIs. STAT. §180.04(14) (1959).
4 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, §122(10). Twenty-seven states, the District of Colum-
bia, and Puerto Rico have now enacted indemnification statues in order to
induce qualified individuals to accept the responsibilities of corporate manage-
ment. Alaska, ALASKA Come. L. ANN. §36-2A-12(o) ; California, CAL. CORP.
CODE ANN. §830, 834(b) ; Colorado, COLO. CORP. Acr §4(o) ; Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STATS. §33-320; Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, §122(10) ; Indiana,
IND. ANN. STAT. §25-202(10) ; Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. §496A.4(15) ; Kentucky,
Ky. REV. STATS. §§271.125(11), 271.375; Maine, ME. REV. STATS. ANN. c.53,
[Vol. 46
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statutes having saving clauses ... there is little doubt that a provision
-for indemnity on the contract of employment could be inserted into the
by-laws.... For the individual director, a surer method of protection
is an independent contract for that purpose. Such a contract is indirectly
sanctioned by those statutes having saving clauses and should fully pro-
tect the director."50 Although settlements are not expressly mentioned
in the Wisconsin statutes, there should be no doubt that a director, acting
in good faith and without any conscious wrongdoing, would be entitled
to indemnification for the reasonable expenses therein incurred.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of the degree of caution with which a director may act,
with the uncertainty of the laws in many areas of corporate activity,
even with advice of counsel, a director may incur substantial expense
in the defense of charges which may be brought against him. As a purely
practical matter these men may have to be assured of indemnification
by the corporation or they may refuse to act as directors, or, if they
serve, may act with such caution that their effectiveness will be seriously
curtailed. In many corporations the difficulty is not getting men to
serve, but the problem is in getting a man who will act-one who will
"take the bull by the horns" and get things done. As a corporate ex-
ecutive told this writer recently, they would rather have a "doer" with
average ability than a man with extraordinary ability who finds it dif-
ficult to make decisions. ie thought the "doer" would be right nine
times out of ten and would get things done. Of course, all things being
equal, they would prefer a "doer" with extraordinary ability. Since
Wisconsin does have both the permissive and the mandatory statutes
for indemnification, the question arises whether these, standing alone,
are sufficient protection. I would submit that it would probably still be
desirable to have an indemnification clause in the by-laws-' and even
§24; Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §64; Michigan, MICH. STATS. ANN.
§21.10(1) ; Minnesota, MINN. REv. STATs. 302.09(7) ; Missouri, Mo. REv. STATS.
§351.355; Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §15-412; Nebraska, NEB. REV.
STATS. §21-103; Nevada, NEv. REv. STATS. §78.070(6) ; New Jersey, N.J. Ri~v.
STATS. §14:3-14; New York, N.Y. GEN. Corp. LAW §61-b, 63-68; North Caro-
lina, N.C. GEN. STATS. §§55-19 to 55-21; North Dakota, N.D. REv. CODE
§10-1904(15) ; Ohio, Onio R~v. CoDE ANN. §1701-13; Oregon, ORE. REV. STATS.
§57.030(15) ; Pennsylvania, PA. STATS. ANN. Tit. 15, §2852-410, Tit. 12, §1323;
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §7-9-12; Texas, TEx. Bus. CoRe. Acr, Art.
2.02(16); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-3(n); Wisconsin, Wis. STATS.
§§180.04(14), 180.407; District of Columbia, D.C. CoDE ANN. §29-904(p) ; and
Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN, Tit. 14, §1202(10).
50 56 MIcH. L. R~v. 453 (1958) at 455-456.
51 Cf. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F. 2d 44 (1948) at page 48,
footnote #1; ". . . The Corporation shall indemnify and hold harmless each
person who shall serve at any time hereafter as a director or officer of the
Corporation from and against any and all claims and liabilities to which such
person shall have become subject by reason of his having heretofore or here-
after been a director or officer of the Corporation, or by reason of any action
alleged to have been heretofore or hereafter taken or omitted by him as such
director or officer, and shall reimburse each such person for all legal and other
19621
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further for an officer or employe to have a provision right in his con-
tract of employment. A further suggestion would be to try to have the
wording of the statutes changed from expenses "actually and necessarily
incurred"' 2 to those of the Iodel Business Corporation Act which were
changed in the 1957 revision to "actually and reasonably incurred" 53 in
the defense of an action. Both would require the director to act pru-
dently and without negligence or misconduct, but the deletion of the
word "necessarily" would not put such a premium on foresight and
prognostication. The court will always be looking at the act with the
omniscience of hindsight and certain expenses incurred a few years ago
may have been reasonable at the time and seemingly necessary, but may
now appear to have been reasonable but totally unnecessary. To those
who say this would be flyspecking, just refer to the statute which in its
present form uses both words, saying the director shall be indemnified
for the "reasonable expenses . . . actually and necessarily incurred."' '
This change may not be necessary but it would reduce the possibility of
litigation which is a duty a lawyer owes generally to his client. Since
the purpose of these statutes is agreed to be to induce capable, qualified,
responsible men to accept positions such as these and to encourage them
to resist unjust charges in the confidence that they will be reimbursed by
the corporation for their expenses of defending themselves when they
are acting for the corporation and its welfare, rather than in their capac-
ity as individuals, such changes which make indemnification more as-
sured and positive seem to be well within the spirit and purpose of the
law.5
5
The plea of nolo contendere is allowed only with permission of the
expenses reasonably incurred by him in connection with any such claim or
liability; provided, however, that no such person shall be indemnified against,
or be reimbursed for any expense in connection with, any claim or liability
arising out of his own negligence or wilful misconduct. The rights accruing to
any person under the foregoing provisions of this Article shall not exclude any
other right to which he may be lawfully entitled, nor shall anything herein
contained restrict the right of the corporation to indemnify or reimburse such
person in any proper case even though not specifically herein provided for.
The Corporation, its directors, officers, employees and agents, shall be fully
protected in taking any action or making any payment under this Article X,
or in refusing so to do, in reliance upon the advice of counsel." Caveat: This
is quoted here as an example of a by-law which makes indemnification man-
datory and not as an example to be religiously or blindly copied. It must be
remembered that there was litigation over this so that the astute and conscien-
tious lawyer will undoubtedly want to improve upon it or draft a completely
new one so as to eliminate as far as possible the dangers of litigation, which
even if successful is time-consuming and expensive.
52 WAIS. STATS. §§180.04(14) and 180.407 (1959).5 3 
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT AN. §4(o) T,2.01(1960).
54 Wis. STAT. §180A07 (1959).
5 56 MIcH. L. REv. 453 at 454. Also, "It is an indispensable condition under the
statute [similar to those in Wisconsin] . . . that a defendant who seeks to im-
pose upon a corporation the responsibility of meeting the expenses of contest-
ing the action against him must have been made a party defendant to the
action by reason of his being or having been a director or officer or employee
of the corporation." People v. Uran Mining Corp. 206 N.Y.S. 2d 455 (1960).
[Vol. 46
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court56 and is often used as a compromise which allows a speedy and
inexpensive termination to the litigation. It does not establish prima
facie evidence to be used in another case based on the same facts. It is
submitted that if the judge allows the plea the director should be al-
lowed indemnification from the corporation for his reasonable ex-
penses.57
DONALD F. FITZGERALD
56 In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (D.C.W.D. Wis. 1938) 23 F. Supp.
531, the court in allowing a plea of nolo condendere said: "This case is be-
fore the Court for disposition upon pleas of nolo contendere entered by some
of the defendants in this action, after negotiations over a considerable period of
time between the parties....
This case .. . lies in a field where the Government might, with equal pro-
priety, have proceeded initially by a civil action in equity, or, as here, by a
criminal prosecution, either being an action to enforce penalties for the viola-
tion of a statute. The Court is of the opinion that the wrong here complained
of is not inalum in se, but rather malnm prohibituin, one peculiarly of an
economic nature and one in which the attainment of a proper understanding
between the parties is of itself a desirable end.
57 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1961) §6045.2 "The limitations on indem-
nification in most of the jurisdictions are negative. In other words, unless
the party has been adjudged or finally adjudged liable for negligence or mis-
conduct, etc., he is entitled to indemnification."
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